UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

18 U.S.C. 1964(c) COMPLAINT FORM

GARY R. WALL, Rule 11 Pro se
WILLIAM COOKSEY SR. Pro se
STEPHEN MANOS, Pro se
Full name(s) of Plaintiff(s)
(Do not use et al.)

Case No. ________________________
(To be supplied by the Court)
v.

LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA
(LIUNA) CHARLES LECONCHE
ROBERT D. LUSKIN ROBERT CHEVERIE
VERE O. HAYNES PATRICK TOMASIEWICZ
LABORERS’ LOCAL 230 RICHARD WEISS
DOMINICK LOPREATO CONN. LABORERS PENSION FUND
JOHN PEZZENTI (CLPF)
Full names of Defendant(s)
(Do not use et al.)

Plaintiff GARY R. WALL is a citizen of Connecticut who presently resides at 60 Carriage Hill Drive, Wethersfield, Connecticut 06109.

ADDITIONAL “A. PARTIES”

PLAINTIFFS

(Plaintiff) WILLIAM COOKSEY SR is a citizen of CONNECTICUT who presently resides at 1097 Maple Avenue, Hartford, CT. 06114
(Plaintiff) STEPHEN MANOS is a citizen of CONNECTICUT who presently resides at 77 HALE ROAD, GLASTONBURY, CT.

DEFENDANT LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA (LIUNA) “PERSON” “ENTITY” OF WASHINGTON, D.C. whose address is 905 16^TH STREET N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006-1765

ADDITIONAL “A. PARTIES” DEFENDANTS

DEFENDANTS

(Defendant) ROBERT D. LUSKIN (IN HOUSE PROSECUTOR “Operating Agreement” with D.O.J./General Executive Board Attorney (LIUNA) is a citizen of Washington, D.C. whose place of business is Laborers’ International Union, 905 16^th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20006-1765.
(Defendant) VERE O. HAYNES is a citizen of Connecticut (SIGNATORY “Operating Agreement” with D.O.J./and at relevant times in this complaint 8^th, 4^th and 1^st V.P. LIUNA) whose place of business is Laborers’ International Union, 905 16^th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006-1765 and LIUNA’S Office, 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06114.
(Defendant) LOCAL 230 is an entity corporation involved in interstate commerce as is LIUNA its parent corporation 18 U.S.C. 1961(3) 1961(4) its business address is 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, CT. 06114.
(Defendant) DOMINICK LOPREATO is a citizen of Connecticut at relevant times in this complaint Secretary/Treasurer/Business Manager Local 230 and an associate in fact of the Coia Enterprise. He gave his last address in his deposition as “333 East River Drive, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108” (Cheverie Associates Address).
(Defendant) JOHN PEZZENTI is a citizen of Connecticut at relevant times in this complaint President, Secretary Treasurer, Business Manager Local 230 his business address is 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06114.
(Defendant) CHARLES LECONCHE is a citizen of Connecticut at relevant times in this complaint President Secretary Treasurer, Business Manager Local 230 his business address is 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06114.
(Defendant) ROBERT M. CHEVERIE, ESQ. is a citizen of Connecticut at relevant times in this complaint an “Associate in Fact” acting as General Counsel Local 230 his business address is 333 East River Drive, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108.
(Defendant) PATRICK TOMASICWICZ, ESQ. is a citizen of Connecticut at relevant times in this complaint defendant Tomasiewicz business address is 836 Farmington Avenue, Suite 109, West Hartford, CT. 06119
(Defendant) RICHARD WEISS is a citizen of Connecticut Director Connecticut Laborers Pension Fund his business address is 435 Captain Thomas Blvd., West Haven, CT. 06516-5896.
(Defendant) CONNECTICUT LABORERS’ PENSION FUND is incorporated in the State of Connecticut its business address is 435 Captain Thomas Blvd., West Haven, CT. 06516-5896.

1. JURISDICTION
   

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to: (list statute(s)
28 U.S.C. 1331 / 18 U.S.C. 1964(c)

1. NATURE OF THE CASE
   

Briefly state the background of the case:
This case is about preventing and restraining the subset federal criminal violations 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) and activities 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) of the Organized Crime Control Act 1970 (OCCA) RICO 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968. Preventing and restraining the harm to the cited plaintiffs LMRDA, Federal Statutory, and Constitutional Property Rights. Preventing and restraining the 18 U.S.C. 1961 criminal violations by preventing and restraining violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) committed by individual defendants, wrongdoers and the (OCCA) RICO enterprise 18 U.S.C. 1961(4). Some of the 1962(d) racketeering schemes going back to in or about 1986 to present day (Open Ended). Preventing and restraining the criminal use of a Federal Statute by and through a Criminal Parallel Legal System known as the “Operating Agreement” (signatory D.O.J.) Obstruction of Justice 18 U.S.C. 1503 in this (OCCA) RICO Complaint – the affect of a conspiracy to defraud the United States 18 U.S.C. 371, and prevent and restrain the defendants through the enterprise from using embezzled membership money in violation of (29 U.S.C. 501(c) pursuant to signed agreement with the D.O.J. to defend against the 1961(1,4,5)/1962(d)(b)(c) RICO crimes.

1. CAUSE OF ACTION
   

The plaintiffs allege that the following constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities or rights under a federal statute have been violated and that the following facts form the basis of the allegations.
CLAIM I: The following Constitutional Rights, Privileges and Federal Statutes have been violated: 5^th Amendment Right to Due Process by Obstruction of Justice 18 U.S.C. 1503 – Multiple 1961(1) violations, 29 U.S.C. 501(c); 18 U.S.C. 664; 18 U.S.C. 1951; 18 U.S.C. 1512; 18 U.S.C. 1513; 18 U.S.C. 1341; 18 U.S.C. 1343; 29 U.S.C. 530; 18 U.S.C. 2; “Privileges” 29 U.S.C. 401; 29 U.S.C. 411; 29 U.S.C. 501(a). All by violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reasons of violating 1962(b)(c) – 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5).
Supporting Facts: SEE ATTACHED RICO STANDING ORDER RULE 11 PLAINTIFF WALL

1. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
   

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demands:
Pursuant to: 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of this Chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney’s fee”.


Pursuant to: 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) “The district Courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of Section 1962 of this Chapter by issuing appropriate orders”.

In this instant (OCCA) RICO Complaint – In addition to the duty to protect the cited plaintiffs from Enterprise Racketeering Injuries – the district Court has a paramount duty and obligation to protect the laws of the United States by preventing and restraining the violations of Section 1962 committed as overt acts of a conspiracy to defraud the United States by the corrupt use of a Federal Statute (RICO).
Therefore: For the reasons illustrated and documented in this (OCCA) RICO Complaint and Standing Order – Multiple subset Federal Criminal violations committed directly against the plaintiffs by and through the associates in fact of an effective date (OCCA) RICO Enterprise 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5), coupled with the Title XII deficiency of RICO (See Pages 84-85 Standing Order). And in addition for reasons of the illustrated and documented Executive Branch and Judicial Branch political corruption in covering and protecting the D.N.C. crimes and bipartisan crimes of the D.O.J. documented in this complaint. For those just cited reasons inter alia, the plaintiffs respectfully request an additional Jury Demand that being access to a Federal Grand Jury to submit this (OCCA) RICO Complaint and give testimony. Please see Standing Order No. 20 at pages 98 –104 this (OCCA) RICO Complaint under Additional Jury Demand (Grand Jury Relief) showing the reasons the plaintiffs should be granted this fundamental public right to access to the protection, of the laws of the United States, through the (Red Flag) authority of Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137, 163
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”

1. JURY DEMAND
   

Do you wish to have a jury trial? Yes X No ____
_________________________________Gary R. Wall
Rule 11 Plaintiff’s Original Signature – 60 Carriage Hill Drive, Wethersfield, CT. 06109
Telephone No. (860) 529-2651

_________________________________William Cooksey Sr.
Plaintiff Original Signature – 1097 Maple Avenue, Hartford, CT. 06114
Telephone No. (860) 956-8334

_________________________________Stephen Manos
Plaintiff Original Signature – 77 Hale Road, Glastonbury, CT. 06033
Telephone No. (860 ) 659-4266

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

The undersigned declare under penalty of perjury they are the plaintiffs in the above action, that they have read the above complaint and that the information contained in the complaint is true and correct. 28 U.S.C. 1746; 18 U.S.C. 1621.
Executed at__________________________ on _____________________________
_______________________________
My Commission Expires
Plaintiffs:
Rule 11 Plaintiff Gary Wall Pro se________________________________________
Plaintiff William Cooksey Sr.Pro se_______________________________________
Plaintiff Stephen Manos Pro se___________________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

GARY R. WALL, CASE NO :_____________________
WILLIAM COOKSEY SR, (To be supplied by the Court)
STEPHEN MANOS,
Plaintiffs Dated: January 20, 2004

v.

LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION (LIUNA)
ROBERT D. LUSKIN,
VERE O. HAYNES,
LABORERS’ LOCAL 230,
DOMINICK LOPREATO,
JOHN PEZZENTI,
CHARLES LECONCHE,
ROBERT M. CHEVERIE, ESQ.,
RICHARD WEISS
CONNECTICUT LABORERS PENSION FUND (CLPF)
PATRICK TOMASIEWICZ, ESQ.
Defendants

STANDING ORDER CIVIL RICO

18 U.S.C. 1964(c)

STANDING ORDER CIVIL RICO

The 3d Circuit in Glessner v. Kenny 952 F.2d 702 defined the substance of a RICO case statement as elaborations of pleading. The follow is that, in a presentation of documented evidence.
STANDING ORDER NO. 1. “The alleged unlawful conduct that is claimed to be in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(b), (c) and or (d).”
There is no violation of tracer subsection 18 U.S.C. 1962(a) in this complaint. There are multiple violations in a pattern of racketeering of Subsection 1962(b)(c)(d).
The unlawful conduct that is claimed under Section 1962(b) is that the defendants member of an associates in fact enterprise through a pattern of racketeering including inter alia violations of RICO predicates under Section 1961 18 U.S.C. 1951; 29 U.S.C. 501(c); 18 U.S.C. 1341; and 18 U.S.C. 1343, 18 U.S.C. 1503; 18 U.S.C. 1513; 18 U.S.C. 1512 acquired and maintain control directly or indirectly of both enterprises, Laborers’ International Union (LIUNA) and Local 230, both enterprises activities affect interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1,4,5).
18 U.S.C. 1962(b) “It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect inter state or foreign commerce”

The unlawful conduct that is claimed under Section 1962(c) is that the associates in fact defendants who are employed by or associated with the associates in fact enterprises LIUNA and Local 230, conduct or participate directly or indirectly in violations of 18 U.S.C. 1961 through a pattern of racketeering which affects interstate commerce.
18 U.S.C. 1962(c) “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”
The unlawful conduct that is claimed under Section 1962(d) is that the associates in fact defendants either by direct participation or indirect participation or by aiding and abetting conspired to violate and or did violate provisions of Subsection 1962(b)(c) of RICO multiple 1962(d) schemes – 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1,4,5).
18 U.S.C 1962(d) “It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of Subsection (a)(b), or (c) of this section”

STANDING ORDER NO. 2 “The identity of each defendants and the alleged misconduct and basis of liability of the defendant”

DEFENDANT LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION (LIUNA) is an entity corporation 18 U.S.C. 1961(3)(4) involved in interstate commerce. LIUNA has been an “associate in fact” organized crime controlled “Captive Labor Organization”, since the effective date of RICO October 15, 1970 and it still is an “associate in fact” Organized Crime Controlled “Captive Labor Organization” under the “Operating Agreement” between LIUNA and the Department of Justice. The present day in tact and protected Coia Governance Structure of LIUNA has been cited by two Presidents Crime Commission’s, President Richard M. Nixon’s and President Ronald Reagan’s Crime Commissions. The only difference is the sons who are cited in the crime commission reports have replaced the deceased fathers in control of the “Captive Labor Organization”. LIUNA is both a person entity under 18 U.S.C. 1961(3) and an associate in fact “union” enterprise under 18 U.S.C. 1961(4):
18 U.S.C. 1961(3) “person” “includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property”

18 U.S.C. 1961(4) “enterprise” “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”

DEFENDANT ROBERT D. LUSKIN is as of February 13, 1995 “In House Prosecutor” pursuant to the “Operating Agreement” between Coia/LIUNA and the Department of Justice. Defendant Luskin was not an impartial outside attorney as the “Operating Agreement” required. Defendant Luskin was retained by Coia as a criminal defense attorney prior to the implementation of the “Operating Agreement”. Defendant Luskin drafted the “Operating Agreement.” Pursuant to the “Operating Agreement” defendant Luskin is a “racketeering investigator” in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961(7).
18 U.S.C. 1961(7) “racketeering investigator” “means any attorney or investigator so designated by the Attorney General¹ and charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect this Chapter [18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.]”

The “Operating Agreement” is a “racketeering, investigation” in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961(8):
18 U.S.C. 1961(8) “racketeering investigation” “means any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved in any violation of this Chapter [18 U.S.C. 1961 et. Seq.”—

Defendant Luskin in his authority as General Executive Board Attorney and In House Prosecutor is in a double position of Trust. One trust to the 800,000 membership of a trade union, the other trust to the government of the United States and its citizens; to protect both the citizens of the United States and the members of a trade union from National Pensions Racketeers, which the associate in fact defendants in this complaint are.
Defendant Luskin negotiated the “Operating Agreement” in his switch capacity position as Arthur Coia’s criminal attorney, negotiating by stopping the Court filing of a 212 page RICO Complaint. The primary charges in the 212-page RICO complaint were pension racketeering charges committed in the furtherance of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) violations. To further this obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. 1503) wrong doer Coia visits the White House 126 times and donates 3.l million through the Democratic National Committee to President Clinton’s campaign.
For the purpose of supporting the credibility of that statement the plaintiffs quote an excerpt from an article printed in the Washington Monthly May 1996 by John Mullagan and Dean Starkman: BEGINNING OF EXCERPT
“But the odd case of Arthur Coia illustrates a less sanguine picture of unions in 1996: one of lingering corruption, mob ties, and political influence a volatile mix. On November 4, 1994, Coia was served with a 212-page draft racketeering complaint from the Justice Department’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. The document accused Coia of extortion, pilfering union funds, and ruthlessly crushing dissidents in his union. Charging that the Laborers’ International was under the mob’s thumb the Justice Department served notice of its intent to take over and throw Coia out.”
“But then something strange happened. The racketeering complaint was never filed. Instead, Coia hired Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. – Oliver North’s Iran-Contra Lawyer – plus a veteran of the Organized Crime Section to fend off prosecutors. Negotiations lasted three months and involved the Criminal Division Chief at Justice. The settlement when it came was an enormous victory for Coia. Not only did he keep his position atop the union, he also beat back reforms that would have brought real democracy to the laborers and handed power to the rank and file”.
“Coia’s story is one of great failure of law enforcement set in a rarified atmosphere of multi-million dollar campaign contributions and White House dinners. Federal law enforcement officials involved in the case who wanted Coia removed but were overruled, grumble about a link between the toothless settlement and Coia’s political friendship with the President.”

END OF EXCERPT
Defendant Luskin in his capacity as GEB Attorney and In House Prosecutor has violated from in or about 1994 to present day (“Open Ended”) 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) in the furtherance of, and for the reason of, the unlawful conduct cited in 18 U.S.C. 1962(b)(c). Defendant Luskin conspired to violate 1962(b) and (c) in order to protect wrongdoer pension racketeer Coia². And in so doing protecting known pension racketeer Arthur Coia from his “pilfering of union funds” “extortion” and “ruthlessly crushing dissidents” (212-page Complaint) inevitably protecting, (Sub Rosa) Arthur Coia’s pension racketeer associates in fact, who are the cited defendants and wrongdoers in this complaint; and as a consequence of defendant Luskin’s multiple 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) violation caused direct proximate harm by the associate in fact enterprise defendants in the form of multiple predicate act violations of 18 U.S.C. 1961 (pleaded accordingly defendant by defendant as violations of 18 U.S.C. 1961 and 18 U.S.C. 1962(d).
Serious consideration by the Court should be given to any one or any group that can “Influence[d]” a Government Civil RICO Complaint involving prosecution memo, documented, pension racketeering acts (18 U.S.C. 1952; 29 U.S.C. 501(c), 18 U.S.C. 1951; 18 U.S.C. 1341; 18 U.S.C. 1343 Inter Alia) – Federal criminal statutory acts committed by reason of violations of 1962(d)(b)(C). The plaintiffs in this matter are the proximate harm (result victims) of “Coia’s story is one of great failure of law enforcement”.


ENTERPRISE RACKETEERING INJURIES LUSKIN 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c)
MULTI SCHEME NO. ONE VIOLATING 18 U.S.C. 1341/ 1962(d)(b)(c)

(Rule 9(b) By letter dated July 24, 1996 addressed to Marc P. Mercier Esq., Beck & Eldergill, P.C. 447 Center Street, Manchester, Connecticut 06040 (Plaintiff Wall & Cooksey’s Attorney at the time) from Robert D. Luskin (Washington, D.C.) referring to a letter he wrote to defendant Cheverie July 16, 1996. Relevant Excerpts of letter quoted:
“I have directed Local 230 to permit Messers. Wall and Cooksey to exercise their right to readmission. For your information, I enclose a copy of my letter to Mr. Cheverie setting out my decision in this matter”

Said letter was part of a scheme in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) to cause plaintiff Wall and Cooksey to rely upon this false information for the purpose of time barring Wall & Cooksey suite in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud).
On May 15, 1997, Wall & Cooksey represented by Attorney Mercier filed Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH)³. On September 10, 1997 defendant Luskin’s reversed his position as to appellants’ right to readmission by entering a declaration in 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) stating in it relevant fraudulent part:
“Upon review of LIUNA’s long established interpretation and application of its constitutionally based readmission right, I concur that the readmission right afforded members of LIUNA must be exercised within twelve (12) months of member’s dues delinquency, except where there is evidence that such delay was the result of conduct prohibited by LIUNA Ethical Practices Code, the LIUNA Ethics and Disciplinary Procedure, or the LIUNA Constitution”.

Not one example of the application of the fraudulent (12) month rule was given for Local 230 because it did not exist. See Chief Judge Winter’s addresses this scheme as intentional equitable estoppel in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 224 F.3d 168 at 173. The equitable estoppel scheme finding in 224 F.3d 168 was committed by and through enterprise racketeering injuries in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961, 18 U.S.C. 1341.
See United States v. Boffa 688 F2d. 919 “this Court held that the RICO predicate act of mail fraud 18 U.S.C. 1341 may encompass a scheme to deprive union members of the right to honest and faithful service of union officials as provided in Section 501 of the LMRDA”
See Kornfield v. First Jersey National Bank 638 F.Supp. 454
“Each individual use of the mails or wires in a fraudulent scheme constitutes a separate offense even if part of one fraudulent scheme, for purpose of RICO requirements of multiple predicate offenses”.

MULTI SCHEME NO. TWO “ABSTRACT” AND “CONVERT” EMBEZZLEMENT TO DEFENDANT CHEVERIE AND LOPREATO VIOLATING 29 U.S.C. 501(c)/ 1962(d)(b)(c)

“501(c) Embezzlement of assets; penalty, any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities, property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both”


Defendant Luskin 29 U.S.C. 501(c) (embezzlement) “convert to the use of another”; regarding defendant Lopreato and defendant Cheverie by letter dated July 7, 1997 from Robert D. Luskin LIUNA a Washington, D.C. addressed to Gary R. Wall, 60 Carriage Hill Drive, Weth., CT. Three sentences in Letter:
“I am writing in response to your letter of June 25, 1997. Mr. Cheverie has been authorized to represent Mr. Lopreato in his official capacity, in order to protect the interest of Local 230 in the on going lawsuit, as you stated in your letter, you have sued Mr. Lopreato in his official and in his personal capacities.”

The capacities of defendant Lopreato in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) are irrelevant to the point of law of 29 U.S.C. 501(c). As part of the Hon. Judge Daley’s sentencing order in UNITED STATES v. LOPREATO ET AL 3-97CR00190(TFGD) May 8, 1996, Mr. Lopreato received 51 months in prison and paid a $250,000 fine⁴. Judge Daley barred Dominick Lopreato from all union activities pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 504. The Criminal Parallel Legal System “Operating Agreement” does not recognize Judge Daley’s 504 Order, a fearless disregard for the order of law. This complaint avers that act by defendant Luskin as unlawful conduct, violating 29 U.S.C. 501(c) by and through a violation of 1962(d) for the purpose of “control” (1962(b)) and participation (1962(c)) in a RICO “enterprise’s affairs” – “through a pattern of racketeering activity” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). “Open Ended” predicate act violations; the only foreseeable end being this complaint.
See: Morrisey v. Curran 482 Fed. Supp. Id 31
“Union should not have paid for legal services rendered in defense of former union president in action under U.S.C.S 501 since former union president was principal beneficiary of misappropriation of union funds”

18 U.S.C. 1962(d) Conspiracy overt act facilitating
See: United States v. Local 560, 581 Fed Supp. 279 Id. 280
“An enterprise conspiracy under Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act may be established without personal conduct amounting to two (2) personal predicate offenses, instead, it is sufficient if government demonstrates agreement through defendants aiding and abetting in at least two (2) such offenses or through assent to commission by someone else or several others of at least two (2) such offenses”

See also for applicability of 18 USC 2 as a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962 Third Circuit in United States v. Local 560 780 F2d 267 Finding #9 at 269 the Court:

“Criminal standard for aiding and abetting applied to charge in Civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act [18 U.S.C.A., 1961 Et. Seq.] suit that union’s executive board aided and abetted other defendants extortionate acts 18 U.S.C.A. 2, 1962.”

MULTI SCHEME NO. THREE D.O.J./ LUSKIN SIGNED AGREEMENT

Defendant Luskin from in or about May 15, 1997 (LMRDA Complaint) and continuing on to present day (Open Ended) has violated 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) by aiding and furthering multiple violations of predicate offense 29 U.S.C.501(c) for the purposes of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) and (c). Defendant Luskin’s 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) violations of 29 U.S.C. 501(c) are subject to RICO defendants LeConche, Pezzenti, Attorney defendant Cheverie, Lopreato and Attorney defendant Tomasiewicz, said 501(c) violations are subject to and are signatory to an agreement with the D.O.J. Quoted from “LIUNA Ethics and Disciplinary Procedure” revised 4/01: in its relevant part:
---“in order to accomplish more fully the purposes of the LIUNA Ethical Practices Code, and the LIUNA Ethics and Disciplinary Procedure, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Executive Board that union funds may not be used for the payment of the legal fees or expenses for the representation of any officer, member, or employee at any stage of a criminal matter or at any stage of a civil action claiming a breach of fiduciary duties prior to the resolution of the allegation or charge”

Please take notice of “at any stage of a civil action” consequently from in or about May 15, 1997 (LMRDA Complaint) Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) through the appeal in the LMRDA Case Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 99-7773 through the remand Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 224 F.3d 168 (2dCir. 2000) and to present day pending in the LMRDA Case 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) and Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al (Interlocutory Injunction) 03-6091 Second Circuit.
Defendant Luskin and the just cited RICO defendants are committing a continuous and open ended violation of 29 U.S.C. 501(c) and are conspiring to do so in violations of “18 U.S.C. 1962(d)” for the purposes of “control” 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) of a RICO enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and in so doing violating 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). Every payment “of the legal fees or expenses for representation” is a predicate act violate of both 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) and 29 U.S.C. 501(c). 29 U.S.C. 501(c) is a direct predicate act under 18 U.S.C. 1961(c) “relating to embezzlement from union funds”. “Embezzlement of union funds” is the gravaman of this complaint (Proximate Harm).
The RICO defendants in the complaint (associates in fact) have been violating 29 U.S.C. 501(c) since the effective date of RICO (October 15, 1970). See: United States v. LeRoy 687 F2d 610 (2d Cir. 1983) (Identifying 501(c) as a RICO predicate act and its interrelationship between the pattern of racketeering and conduct of the enterprise affairs under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)). The Coia Governance Structure of LIUNA was an objective target of the “Congressional statement of findings and purpose. Act Oct., 15, 1970 P. L. 91-452 1 84 Stat. 922”
The first finding of the Congressional Statement referred to Organized Crime as being “highly sophisticated” that was in 1970. The reason that the Coia Group (associates in fact) were considered “highly sophisticated” in 1970 was the millions in membership money that was embezzled 29 U.S.C. 501(c) to pay their “highly sophisticated” attorneys to protect their “extortion”, “pilfering of union funds” and “Crushing Dissidents”. That was the Congressional statement of finding in 1970. The present day showing and statement in this complaint shows the evolution of “highly sophisticated” effective date October 15, 1970 RICO enterprise to a much higher form of sophistication using the hundreds of millions in fund money generated every week by 800,000 members to criminally “Influence[d”] the Office of the President and First Lady (Documented 126 visits to the Clinton White House by Arthur Coia plus multiple trips with Hilary Clinton) and criminal Influence[d] the Organized Crime section of the Justice Department to this present day (“Open Ended”)⁵. This dangerous situation is what Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137, 163 was written for. Arthur Coia Jr. Has employed the top sophisticated attorneys in Washington D.C., Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., Robert D. Luskin, Patton and Boggs, and Williams and Connelly. He employed them all with embezzled membership money in order to protect him from the “pilfering” of millions in union funds and in so doing protecting his associates in fact RICO enterprise which the cited plaintiffs have proximate harm from.

MULTI SCHEME NO. FOUR EMBEZZLEMENT 29 U.S.C. 501(c) BY EXTORTION 18 U.S.C. 1951 CONTINUED AND FURTHERED BY THE OPERATING AGREEMENT

In or about the beginning of 1986 in a pattern of racketeering to present day RICO defendant Lopreato, LeConche, Pezzenti and Attorney Cheverie have violated 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Hobbs Act) by systematically creating an atmosphere of fear in Local 230 in order that any member would be afraid to question any of their expenditures legal or otherwise. During union membership meetings dating back to 1986 when Plaintiff Wall would attempt to inform the membership of how much (membership money was being spent on the pending (at the time) NLRB case Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 LIUNA, Lopreato, LeConche, Pezzenti 39 CB-827 – 39 CB-833⁶. From the podium the cited defendants and (Arthur Coia Sr. present many times on tape) would direct the membership to boo; Not after I spoke but as I tried to speak (extortionate tactic) stopping anyone from hearing or understanding what I was trying to say and in so doing making an example of a member who questions their actions. Fear of economic execution to the membership [Blanket Hobbs Act] unless they clap or boo on signal. Fear of economic execution or violence and actual economic execution and actual violence and threats of violence to the plaintiffs in this complaint; Embezzlement by extortion violating 18 U.S.C. 1951 in order to embezzle in the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 501(c); Conspiracy to do so in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) in multiple schemes against Wall and Cooksey 1986 to present day and against plaintiff Manos in or about 1995 to present day, exact same pattern in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5).
TOLLING RICO
The Second Circuit has articulated the preferred accrual rule for RICO for three reasons.
FIRST: It is the simplest to apply because it focuses on the plaintiffs actual or constructive discovery of its injury, which is keyed to the objective fact of injury and is readily determinable by a tier of fact.
SECOND: Commencement of the limitation period upon occurrence of the first injury does not leave a plaintiff without remedy – just without treble damages until the second predicate act occurs.
THIRD: If the second predicate act in the pattern occurs more than four years after the first, a RICO claim maybe stated upon occurrence of the second predicate act sec: Bankers Trust v. Rhoades 859 Fed. Rep. 2d 1096 United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit at 1102
--“statute of limitations which runs – where a substantive violation is alleged pursuant to subsection (a)(b) or (c) – from the time of the last predicate act of racketeering activity by the defendant, or where a conspiracy violation is alleged pursuant to subsection (d) – from the time the objectives of the conspiracy have been accomplished or abandoned”---

THE ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
The plaintiffs in the complaint believe that the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit sitting En Banc has best defined the RICO element of enterprise conspiracy in U.S. v. Elliot 571 Fed. Rep. 2d 880 at 902.
---“against this background, we are convinced that, through RICO, Congress intended to authorize the single prosecution of a multi-faceted conspiracy by replacing the inadequate “wheel” and “chain” rationales with a new statutory concept: the Enterprise” “[9-11] to achieve this result, Congress acted against the back drop of horn book conspiracy law, under the general federal conspiracy statute – in the context of organized crime, this principle inhibited mass prosecutions because a single agreement or “common objective” cannot be inferred from the commission of highly diverse crimes by apparently unrelated individuals. RICO help to eliminate this problem by creating a substantive offense which ties together these diverse parties and crimes. Thus, the object of a RICO conspiracy is to violate a substantive RICO provision here, to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity – and not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity”

Defendant Luskin has liability in this extortion/embezzlement scheme in accordance with his authority as G.E.B. attorney, quoting page 24 LIUNA Ethics and Disciplinary Procedure citing the authority of Luskin as G.E.B. attorney:
“As long as the offending conduct at issue is deemed to be relevant to an accused’s current membership in or service to, the union the G.E.B. attorney may bring charges, regardless of when the conduct at issue occurred”

The F.B.I (Chicago Office) pursuant to their investigation of plaintiff Wall and Cooksey (at the direction of defendant Luskin) were given tape copies of membership meetings 1986 through 1989 (defendant Haynes and Coia Sr present majority of times). Plaintiff Wall wore the tape recorder in order to protect him from being framed for crimes (which it ultimately did). The tapes clearly show the extortionate control the same (to this day) Governance Structure of Local 230 has over the membership. Said tapes were later subpoenaed back from the F.B.I. in Chicago By Wall. Defendant Luskin had full knowledge without the tapes that the Coia (Sr. & Jr.) Governance Structure controlled Local 230 through fear. The tapes just document that fact. Said tapes are almost indistinguishable from the tape recordings that plaintiff Manos recorded nine (9) years later; That being, booing before plaintiff Manos or Gene Julian tried to speak (not after they spoke) an extortionate silencing tactic used in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) for control in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) and “participation in the affairs” of a RICO enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). In addition to the “Common Objective” finding in Elliot En Banc Supra see United States v. Turkette 452 U. S. 576 “The [enterprise] is proved by evidence of an on going organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the associates function as a continuing unit.”
Professor Clyde W. Summers who drafted the LMRDA, comprehends and explains the affect of Blanket Hobbs Act the best in U. S. v. Local 560 Supra 581 F. Supp at 321:
Professor Summers At 321: “This sense of fear within the Local – causing members to believe that it is not safe to protest or organize – is so overwhelming that it is not likely to correct itself in the foreseeable future.”

DEFENDANTS LUSKIN VIOLATING 18 USC 1962(d)(b)(c) PLAINTIFF MANOS – LUSKIN MULTI SCHEME NO. FIVE

From on or about 1996 and continuing to this present day defendant Luskin has violated 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) with the cited defendants and wrongdoers in this complaint, And in so doing “injured” plaintiff Manos’s LMRDA and Constitutional Rights (Property Rights) by causing TERMINATION of said Rights committing multiple counts of Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. 1503). Defendant Luskin has also “Injured” plaintiff Manos’s Federal Right of Protection against violations of Federal Criminal Statutes by TERMINATING said rights through a Criminal Parallel Legal System (“Operating Agreement”) by and for reasons of 18 U.S.C. 1962(b)(c).
THE THIRD CIRCUIT CONCURRING WITH THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN Shearin v. E. F. Hutton 885 F2d 1162 at 1169:
---“Taking into account all the provisions of Section 1962, either racketeering activity or classic overt conspiracy act may qualify as “predicate acts” to a RICO violation that causes injury. Sedima further indicates that classic conspiracy acts not only may, but should so qualify. This accords with RICO’s plain meaning. Section 1964(c) states that a person need only sustain an injury “by reason of a violation of Section 1962”---

See also U. S. v. Local 560, 581 Fed. Supp 279 Id. 289

“Individuals may be charged under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act as “persons” while being grouped collectively as a “enterprise” under the well-established association in fact doctrine 18 USCA 1961-1968”

Defendant Luskin’s violations of 1962(d) through aiding and abetting 1961 violations by the associate in fact enterprise including inter alia multiple Hobbs Act violations 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Pleaded under Standing Order No 4); 18 U.S.C. 1513 retaliating against a witness; (pleaded under Standing Order No. 4) 29 U.S.C. 530 LMRDA assault (pleaded under Standing Order No. 4) 18 U.S.C. 1503 Obstruction of Justice (pleaded under Standing Order No. 4) 18 U.S.C. 1341 mail fraud (pleaded under Standing Order No. 5(c) in compliance with F.R.C.P. 9(b).
In addition to the just demonstrated multiple violations of RICO defendant Luskin in his dual positions of GEB Attorney and in house prosecutor has invalided and corrupted LIUNA’s constitution and has invalided the Constitution of the United States to the membership of LIUNA and Local 230. The (Obstruction of Justice) control comes from the following signatory provisions of the Operating Agreement. Quote relevant excerpt from “Summary of LIUNA Agreement” 1995 (Open Ended):
“This agreement is a first-of-its-kind in the history of union-government partnering – it is completely different from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters situation, which was an example of government takeover and control of a union.”

Unlike the Teamster Consent Decree, defendant Luskin controls discipline in the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(5) and 29 U.S.C. 529. In the Teamster Consent Decree, discipline in the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(5) and 29 U.S.C. 529 was controlled by a Federal Court. Also under the “Operating Agreement” unlike the Teamsters Consent Decree, defendant Luskin controls enforcement of Federal Statutes, including but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5), 18 U.S.C. 1962(b,c,d) violations. A Criminal Parallel Legal System – Quote Page 6 of the 1995 “Operating Agreement” Page 7 of the revised 2001 “Operating Agreement” relevant part:
“Anyone, including a union officer, representative, member, contractor or vendor, or law enforcement organization may refer a complaint against a union official or member by filing it with the G.E.B. attorney. The G.E.B. attorney or the Inspector General will investigate it and decide whether charges should be brought.”

These two provisions which are signatory to the Department of Justice, gave defendant Luskin the authority and ability to insulate and protect an Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) RICO enterprise.
DEFENDANT VERE O. HAYNES
Defendant Haynes was appointed 8^th V.P. LIUNA in or about 1986 by Arthur Coia, Sr. Defendant Haynes at relative times in this complaint has also held 3^rd V.P. and 1^st V.P. positions in LIUNA. Defendant Haynes mailing address is 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut and Laborers’ International Union, 905 16^th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006-1765. Defendant Haynes is liable for multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. 1503, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 28 U.S.C. 501(c) 18 U.S.C. 1951 of 411 Rights committed by reason of violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) in the furtherance and reason of violating of 1962(c). Defendant Haynes was a signatory with the Department of Justice in the first phase of the “Operating Agreement”, February 13, 1995 to February 2000. At the time of the signing defendant Haynes was First V.P. LIUNA. Defendant Haynes has always been a part time V.P. He also is some type of male nurse at the Hebrew Home. Defendant Haynes was picked by Luskin and Coia to be signatory to the “Operating Agreement” with the Department of Justice because he will sign anything they put in front of him. Defendant Haynes was questioned on this same subject matter (for purposes of RICO Mens Rea) in a deposition taken by Wall & Cooksey in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) at Room 320, Federal Building, Hartford, Connecticut on November 26, 2001.
ENTERPRISE RACKETEERING INJURIES HAYNES 18 U.S.C. 1503/ 1962(d)(c)
Defendant Haynes violating RICO predicate 18 U.S.C. 1503 Obstruction of Justice by injuring the cited plaintiffs Rights to the remedial purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (Civil RICO) injuring also the cited plaintiffs Rights to the remedial purposes of our LMRDA and Statutory Rights of Protection. Doing so in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reasons of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) in a 1961(5) pattern of racketeering. In support of that Civil RICO charge, the plaintiffs enter relevant excerpts from the Haynes deposition Page 19:
Wall: “Let’s go to page 51 of that book. It says summary of LIUNA Agreement. That’s the Operational Agreement; correct?”
Haynes: “Yep”
Wall: “Now, your signature – we’re going to go back to your signature in the back”
Haynes: “Yes”
Wall: “Your signature is”—
Haynes: “Yes my signature is there”
Wall: “that says you’re Third Vice President. You told me now you’re First Vice President?”
Haynes: “Yes”
Wall: “You see for the United States it says JoAnn Harris; did you know her?”
Haynes: “No”
Wall: “James B. Burns; he’s from the United States Attorneys’ Office. Did you ever meet him?
Haynes: “No”
PAGE 20
Wall: “Paul E. Coffey; did you ever meet him?”
Haynes: “No”
Wall: “John Serpico is on here, he didn’t sign it, and Samuel Caivano, he didn’t sign it. How come they didn’t sign it?”
Haynes: “I don’t recall why they didn’t”
Wall: “Could you tell me what your understanding is of the Operational Agreement between the United States and LIUNA?”
Haynes: “I usually leave that up to the counsel”
Wall: “What counsel”?
Haynes: “The general executive board counsel” (defendant Luskin)
Wall: “So you don’t know?”
Haynes: “(shakes head)”
Wall: “You shook your head no. That’s a no?”
Haynes: “Ask me the question”
Wall: “You don’t know what the concept of the Operational Agreement is – what the purpose of it was?”
Haynes: “I don’t remember”
Wall: “You don’t remember”
Haynes: “No”
Later in the deposition plaintiff Wall shows defendant Haynes a copy of the face of the 212-page RICO Complaint.
Testimony in its relevant part at page 27:
Wall: “Do you realize that those people are well-known, high ranking organized crime figures?”
Haynes: “I really don’t know, Sir.”
Wall: “So this is news to you. That you’re mentioned in a draft complaint – a RICO draft complaint with these individuals, that’s what you’re saying? This is the first time you’re being informed of this?”
Haynes: “that I knew”
It became very evident during the deposition why Luskin and Coia⁷ used defendant Haynes in their 1962(d) conspiracy to Obstruct Justice 18 U.S.C. 1503. Defendant Haynes violating RICO Predicate 29 U.S.C. 501(c) doing so by violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) Haynes deposition quoted again in its relevant part: page 21
Wall: “Do you know Mr. Dominick Lopreato”.
Haynes: “Yes, I know Dominick Lopreato”.
Wall: “Do you consider him a barred individual?”
Haynes: “No”
Wall: “No”
Haynes: “No”
Wall: “Do you realize that membership money is representing him at this – in this case?”
Wall: “In other words, Dominick is not paying lawyer’s fees here. The membership of Local 230 is paying do you realize that”
Attorney Tomasiewicz and Attorney Fussell objects to the question defendant Haynes later answer the question on page 22:
Wall: “You didn’t realize that”
Haynes: “No”

In addition to the fact that defendant Haynes was also using membership money (29 U.S.C. 501(c)) in said depositions in violation of the LIUNA/DOJ agreement. In addition to that fact 29 U.S.C. 504 was drafted to protect members from convicted Labor/Pension Racketeering. Defendant Haynes has obstructed Justice in his signatory capacity and V.P. capacity in violation of 1962(d) violating 1962(c) violating both 29 U.S.C. 501(c) and obstructing and injuring the cited plaintiffs remedial right to the protection of 29 U.S.C. 504 by and through a Criminal Parallel Legal System (“Operating Agreement”).
DEFENDANT HAYNES 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) FOR REASONS OF VIOLATING AIDING AND ABETTING 18 U.S.C 2 EXTORTION 18 U.S.C. 1951 IN BOTH CAPACITIES AS V.P. LIUNA, AND SIGNATORY TO D.O.J.

See Local 560 Supra Re: Civil RICO “18 U.S.C.A. 2 1962”
PHASE ONE PLATFORM EXTORTION SCHEME
From in or about 1986 to 1990 defendant Haynes has violated plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey LMRDA Right to Freedom of Speech (29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2)) by aiding and abetting the extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951) of said LMRDA Right by LIUNA officers, Local 230 officers and the Executive Board Members in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reason of 1962(c).
Explanation: At consecutive monthly membership meetings from in or about 1986 through 1990 in a “pattern of racketeering” (1961(5)), defendant Haynes “participate[d]” “In the conduct of” this effective date RICO “enterprise’s affairs” (1962(d)(c)) – by “directly” being involved in the extortion of plaintiff Wall’s and plaintiff Cooksey’s LMRDA Freedom of Speech Rights (29 U.S.C. 411 (a)(2)) by standing up out of his chair as all of the officials LIUNA and Local 230 officers did as they shouted down any attempt by plaintiff Wall or plaintiff Cooksey to speak when plaintiff Wall would request from the floor for the officers of Local 230 to total up the membership money being spent on the pending NLRB case. Defendant Haynes participated in the shoot down with the associates in fact. By standing and clapping while other, defendants and wrongdoers, shout down Freedom of Speech enabled, assisted, encouraged and incited Hobbs Act Extortion of plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey LMRDA Rights. Defendant Haynes continues his involvement from the platform in an identical pattern of extortion repeated in or about 1996 to 1998 against plaintiff Manos, and extortion victim Mr. Gene Julian, being shouted down by the same defendants and wrongdoers “function[ing] as a continuing unit” Turkette Supra.
PHASE TWO PLATFORM EXTORTION SCHEME
In 1996-1998 defendant Lopreato is not involved in the second platform extortion scheme. He is barred by his indictment (The Honorable Judge Daley is alive Lopreato is barred!!).
Present now at membership meetings (’96 – ’98 scheme) is Coia and Luskin’s hand picked investigators investigating Coia’s 30 year associates in fact (Local 230) RICO associates, rather than investigating by participating in the (continuing) second phase extortionate “affairs” of a RICO enterprise. Defendant Haynes from in or about 1986-1990 in his capacity of 8^th V.P. – and from in or about 1996 – 1998, defendant Haynes in his capacity as 3^rd V.P., 1^st V.P., and Signatory to the “Operating Agreement” with the D.O.J. enabled, assisted, and encouraged the extortion of plaintiff’s Wall, Cooksey and Manos LMRDA Rights by the same method and for the same common goal. The two extortionist schemes in violation of (1962(d) violating 1962(c) by extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951) of the cited plaintiffs LMRDA 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) Freedom of Speech Rights, in a pattern of racketeering in violation of 1961(5)⁸.
See: United States v. Indelicato EnBanc 865 Fed. Rep. 1370 Finding No. 3 at 1370
“Necessary relatedness between RICO predicate acts may be established by proof of their temporal proximity, common goals, similarity of methods, or repetitious 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,5).”

DEFENDANT HAYNES 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(c) CONTINUING VIOLATION OF EXTORTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHTS TO THE “FINDINGS, PURPOSES, AND POLICY” OF 29 U.S.C. 401 ET. SEQ.

April 1996 Membership Meeting Enterprise Racketeering Scheme

In or about the April 1996 Local 230 membership meeting, Local 230, with defendant Haynes present in his dual capacity as 1^st V.P. and Signatory “Operating Agreement” with the United States – defendant Haynes participated in an open extortion of plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey Federal Protected Rights by abetting defendant LeConche’s reading of a letter dated April 9, 1996 out loud to the membership fraudulently composed by the defendants and others accusing plaintiff Wall of very serious violent crimes with plaintiff Cooksey being with Wall when these crimes were committed a “majority of the times” (proven fabricated in depositions). These fabricated allegations were meant to label both Wall and Cooksey as criminally barred through the purview of the “Operating Agreement” (discipline) and to create an unsafe membership environment and unsafe work environment. An open act of extortion of the plaintiffs 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(1) (“Equal Rights”) (a)(2) (“Freedom of Speech and Assembly”)(a)(5) (“Safeguards against improper disciplinary action”).
July 1997 Executive Board Meeting Enterprise Racketeering Scheme
Defendant Haynes at a Local 230 Executive Board Meeting enabled multiple Hobbs Act violations being committed against plaintiff Manos and an actual 29 U.S.C. 530 assault being committed against plaintiff Manos in violation of 1962(d), all on tape with defendant Haynes at same table. Examples (CL: defendant LeConche SM: plaintiff Manos):
CL: “why’d you call Ted Grabowski and try to solicit a vote against John Silva, asshole!”
SM: “Because I’m a member and I have a right – I have a right to lobby”
CL: “You don’t have a right” (Hobbs Act violation)
CL: “Steve, you’re about that fuckin’ close for me ripping your fuckin’ throat out personally!” (Hobbs Act violation)
CL: “Fuck you! It ain’t a threat, it’s a fuckin’ promise!” (Hobbs Act violation)

Manos is attacked blind-sided by Sergeant-At-Arms, Frank Freeman (tape still recording) thrown violently over a chair onto the ceramic tile concrete floor, and then thrown out the fire exit door opened by the owner of the restaurant where the Ex. Board Meeting was being held 29 U.S.C. 530 assault for reasons of 18 U.S.C. 1959(a) and 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reasons of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) (See Salerno Supra footnote 7 page 19). Frank Freeman now holds plaintiff Manos former position as V.P. Local 230. Doctor reports showed multiple contusions to Manos leg, chest and arms, right shoulder sprain – left wrist sprain. Manos flees to his car and is pursued. At Manos car in the street, defendant LeConche states (tape still recording).
CL: “Do yourself a favor. Don’t show up for a while! We own you Fucker! (Hobbs Act).

“We own you” is what the Hobbs Act was written for. The statement “We Own You” shows clearly that Local 230 its Executive Board and its International are captive labor organizations controlling the membership through fear. See: Second Circuit in U. S. v. I.B.T. 708 F. Supp 1388 at 1398”. The Hobbs Act, unlike the mail or wire fraud statutes, was enacted specifically to address labor racketeering”, see also U. S. v. I.B.T. at 1405 “Civil RICO Actions usually allege conduct that is either identical to or a subset of criminal allegations”. See making a distinction between the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. 1951) and an LMRDA Assault (29 U.S.C. 530) see U. S. v. Local 560, 780 F2d 267 at 282.
“While the Hobbs Act, as evidenced by its explicit and unambiguous language, was designed to combat extortion – Section 530 of the LMRDA makes no mention of “extortion” and rather appears to focus on prohibiting physical assaults on members in connection with a union’s internal affairs and in the exercise of their statutory right” ---

See Also: Indelicato Supra at 1370 Finding No. 5:
“Multiple acts of racketeering activity are not excluded from reach of RICO simply because they achieve their objective quickly or because they further but a single scheme 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1, 5).

See Also: U.S. v. Local 560 581 F. Supp. 279 at 333:
---“aided and abetted by the defendant officers and business agents of Local 560, unlawfully affected commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce by extorting certain intangible property rights, rights to union democracy under 401 of the LMRDA – from the membership of Local 560, in repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. 1951”


March 25, 1998 Membership Meeting Enterprise Racketeering Scheme
In another act of open extortion of the plaintiffs membership rights with defendant Haynes participating in the affairs of an enterprise by enabling and abetting the reading out loud to the membership of a fabricated letter on March 25, 1998⁹. As stated in the footnote, this letter was a different letter than the April 9, 1996 letter. This letter was dated March 2, 1998. Said letter was addressed to Robert D. Luskin, Washington, D.C. and signed by defendant LeConche, defendant Pezzenti; Butch Granell Recording Secretary; Thaddeus Grabowski President; Wayne Silva Exec. Board Member; James Lawson Exec. Board member. Said letter intentions were extortion of membership rights by fear in the meaning of Hobbs Act to the membership and furthering said extortion by using the mail and wire to do so 18 U.S.C. 1341, 18 U.S.C. 1343 Boffa Supra (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) at Standing Order 5(c)). The reading out of the March 2, 1998 letter on March 25, 1998, labeled plaintiff Manos to the membership as barred for “associating with Mr. Gary Wall”--- extorting plaintiff Manos’s 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) right to “Freedom of Speech and Assembly” said reading out of letter also labeled plaintiff Manos barred to the membership for filing an affidavit in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) and for participating in the “Litigation against the Local Union” and for “accompanied Mr. Wall to Court in Bridgeport on Tuesday February 24, 1998” (Federal District Court), violating plaintiff Manos, Cookseys and Walls 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(4) right “Protection of the Right to Sue”; Doing so, by violating Manos, Cooksey and Wall’s 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(5) right to “safeguards against improper disciplinary action”¹⁰ willful, flagrant extortion of plaintiffs Manos, Cooksey and Wall’s LMRDA rights and an example (Blanket Hobbs Act) to the membership not to question any action of the leadership of Local 230. Also sending the message that the Courts are not open to you the membership (“Captive Labor Organization”) of Local 230. Defendant Haynes participation violating 18 U.S.C.1503 (Obstruction of Justice) 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Extortion of Membership Right) doing so by violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reasons of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).
18 U.S.C. 1503/ 18 U.S.C. 1341, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(c) NOVEMBER 2001
In a deposition taken of defendant Haynes dated November 2001 in Hartford, Connecticut, defendant Haynes enables, aided and abets the extortion scheme and assault by giving false testimony in said deposition stating said Hobbs Act violations and the assault never happen and obstructing Justice as a signatory with the United States. Said fraudulent statements were mailed December 3, 2001 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (stated with particularity under Standing Order No. 5(c)).
See: United States v. Boffa 688 F2d 919 this Court held that the RICO predicate act of mail fraud 18 U.S.C. 1341 may encompass a scheme to deprive union members of the right to honest and faithful service of union officials as provided in Section 501 of the LMRDA”

See United States v. Davidson 760 F2d 97 “reasonably anticipate that the mails would be used” violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reason of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
See United States v. Field 432 Fed. Supp 55 “the language of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) clearly contemplates prolonged course of conduct and like Statute of Limitations for conspiracy, which runs from date of last overt act, Statute of Limitations of violations of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) runs from date of last act of racketeering activity”

See also: United States v. Torress Lopez 851 F. 2d 520” Statute of Limitations for RICO conspiracy 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) should not begin to run until accomplishment of or abandonment of objectives of conspiracy”—

See also: Bankers Trust Supra EnBanc 2d Cir. at 1102 “Statute of Limitations which runs” --- “where a conspiracy violation is alleged pursuant to subsection (d) from the time the objectives of the conspiracy have been accomplished or abandoned”---

See also Agency Holding v. Malloy – Duff 483 U. S. 143
“The 4 year statute of limitations applicable to Clayton Act Civil enforcement actions, 15 U.S.C. 15(b) applied in RICO civil enforcement actions”

DEFENDANT LUSKIN AND DEFENDANT HAYNES 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) CONSPIRACY LUSKIN VIOLATING 1962(b)(c) HAYNES VIOLATING 1962(d)(c)

From in or about February 1995 to in or about February 2000 (within the 4 year statute of limitations), defendant Luskin and defendant Haynes conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) by multiple acts of obstructing justice (18 U.S.C. 1503) 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5,) in their dual capacity as LIUNA officials and signatory to the “Operating Agreement” with the United States.
Defendant Luskin and Defendant Haynes are the only two defendants Civil Rico charged with 18 U.S.C. 1503 (obstruction of justice) inter alia. Because they are the only two signatories to the “Operating Agreement” with the United States, a racketeering scheme in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). In their capacity as signatories with the United States and as officials of LIUNA – both defendants have by either participation, authorization or ratification violated 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) with each other and with the other defendants in violation of multiple direct predicate RICO acts 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5).
Repeating the important distinction in this complaint, only defendants Luskin and Haynes are being Civil RICO charged with 18 U.S.C. 1503 as an “activity” of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). For defendant Luskin for reasons of 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) “control” and 1962(c) “participation affairs of an enterprise”. For defendant Haynes, violation 1962(d) for reason of 1962(c) “participation affairs of an enterprise”. The 1961(5) “Operating Agreement’ obstructed a 212-page RICO complaint, it obstructed the remedial protection of multiple predicate act violations of 1961 committed against the plaintiffs and it directly harmed the plaintiffs LMRDA and Statutory Property Rights.
Discovery in 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) has documented that the “Operating Agreement” has obstructed the Executive Branch of government and the Judicial Branch of government. Quote page 6 of the 1995 Agreement page 7 of the revised 2001agreement in its relative part:
“Anyone, including a union officer, representative, member, contractor or vendor, or law enforcement organizations may refer a complaint against a union official or member by filing it with the G.E.B. attorney. The G.E.B. attorney or the Inspector General will investigate it and decide whether charges should be brought”.

Quote relevant excerpts from “Summary of LIUNA Government Agreement”
“This agreement is a first – of – its – kind in the history of union – government partnering” --- “ it is completely different from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters situation, which was an example of government take-over and control of a union”.

The key difference between the “Operating Agreement” for LIUNA and the Consent Decree for I.B.T. is the “Operating Agreement” has no judicial jurisdiction. The Consent Decree was consent by I.B.T. for Judicial jurisdiction. Also officials of I.B.T. had no power to “discipline”. Under the Consent Decree, “discipline” is the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court. “Discipline” and discretion to discipline under the “Operating Agreement” is “controlled” by defendant Luskin and his hand picked Inspector General both hand picked and paid for by Arthur Coia Jr.
The foregoing demonstration shows multiple 1962(d) schemes committed by defendant Haynes. Some dating as far back as 1986 and continuing to present day in his capacity as 8^th, 3rd and 1^st V.P. and one major 1962(d) scheme (18 U.S.C. 1503) dating from February 13, 1995 to February 2000 in his capacity as signatory to the United States, all violating 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5).
DEFENDANT LOCAL 230 is an entity corporation 18 U.S.C. 1961(3)(4) involved in interstate commerce; Local 230 has been a “Captive Labor Organization” for over three decades and continues to be maintained and controlled by the same “Governance Structure” by and through the “Operating Agreement” with the Department of Justice, from February 13, 1995 to present day, with no determinable completion date. Arthur Coia Sr. with three of the defendants (Lopreato, LeConche and Pezzenti) acquired “control” of Local 230 through filing fraudulent LM15 and LM 16 trusteeship forms in or about 1970. And the pattern of racketeering continues “Open Ended” to this day with “evidence that the associates function as a continuing unit” Turkette Supra 452 U.S.576; 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1,4,5).
DEFENDANT LOPREATO: Defendant Lopreato has been Business Manager of Local 230 at relevant times in this RICO complaint. He has also been a hierarchal associate in fact of the Coia enterprise at all times relevant in this RICO Complaint 18 U.S.C. 1961(1,4,5). Defendant Lopreato is also a defendant in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH). Defendant Lopreato gave his mailing address in deposition as 333 East River Drive, East Hartford, CT. 06108 (Attorney Cheverie office address).


RICO ENTERPRISE BACKGROUND 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c)
Defendant Lopreato is an effective date (Oct. 15, 1970) RICO defendants. Defendant Lopreato acquired control of Local 230 in or about 1970 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) through an unlawful conspiracy in violation of 1962(d) with Arthur Coia Sr., defendant LeConche and defendant Pezzenti by filing fraudulent LM 15 and 16 trusteeship forms with the United States Department of Labor.
ENTERPRISE RACKETEERING INJURIES LOPREATO 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c)
From in or about 1986 to 1990 defendant Lopreato participated in the affairs of an enterprise in the extortion of the plaintiffs LMRDA 401; 411; and 501 Property Rights See quotation Platform Extortion Scheme at pages 19, 20, 21. In addition, defendant Lopreato interfered with by extortion plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey’s Right to Work, See NLRB Case Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230/LIUNA et al 39-CA-3046. From in or about Late 1991 early 1992, defendant Lopreato in his position as Business Manager and pension trustee participated in the fraudulent depletion of plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey’s pension in violation of 18 U.S.C. 664. See Under Defendant Connecticut Laborers Pension Fund at pages 52-59 of this RICO Complaint. From in or about 1992 to 1995 defendant Lopreato participated in the affairs of an enterprise by committing multiple acts of mail fraud 18 U.S.C. 1341 See Boffa Supra, pleaded in compliance with F.R.C.P. 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c).
On or about December 2002 defendant Lopreato gave false testimony in the furtherance of a scheme to deprive the plaintiffs of their Section 401, 411, 501 LMRDA Rights See Boffa Supra doing so by committing mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341) in the mailing of the deposition see United States v. Davidson 760 F. 2d 97 (reasonably anticipate that the mails would be used) for reason of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(b,c) pleaded in compliance with F.R.C.P. 9(b) in Standing Order No. 5(c).
From in or about July 1996 to present day defendant Lopreato has participated in the affairs of an enterprise by violating 29 U.S.C. 501(c) see at pages 7, 8,9 of this RICO Complaint MULTI SHCEME NO. TWO “ABSTRACT” AND “CONVERT” EMBEZZLEMENT TO DEFENDANT CHEVERIE AND LOPREATO”. Defendant Lopreato has committed the 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) violations by violating 1962(d) for reasons of violating 1962(b)(c) to this day open ended. Defendant Lopreato is a Hierarchical associate in fact of the Sub Rosa 1961(4) RICO enterprise that controls Local 230, with no regard for Honorable Judge Daley’s 29 U.S.C. 504 Barring Order.
DEFENDANT JOHN PEZZENTI defendant Pezzenti has been Business Manager, President and V.P. of Local 230 at relevant times in this RICO Complaint. He has also been an associate in fact of this Coia enterprise at all relevant times in this RICO Complaint. Defendant Pezzenti is also a defendant in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97CV-00942(JCH). Defendant Pezzenti’s business address is 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06114.
ENTERPRISE BACKGROUND PEZZENTI
Defendant Pezzenti is an effective date (Oct. 15, 1970) RICO defendant. Defendant Pezzenti participated in the acquired control of Local 230 in or about 1970 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(c) through an unlawful conspiracy with Arthur Coia Sr. and defendant Lopreato and LeConche by filing fraudulent LM 15 and 16 trusteeship forms with the United States Department of Labor.
ENTERPRISE RACKETEERING INJURIES PEZZENTI
From in or about 1986 to 1990 defendant Pezzenti participated in the affairs of an enterprise in the extortion of the plaintiffs LMRDA 401, 411, 501 Property Rights see “Platform Extortion Scheme at pages 20, 21, 22. In addition, defendant Pezzenti interfered with by extortion plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey’s Right to Work. See: NLRB Case Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 LIUNA et al 39-CV-3046. From in or about 1986 to present day defendant Pezzenti has extorted 18 U.S.C. 1951, plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey’s 29 U.S.C. 401(b) Employment Rights by intentionally and fraudulently labeling out loud to the membership, plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey as the persons who committed the baseball bat assault against him – from 1986 to 1995 identifying plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey as black balled members because of the crime – from 1995 to present day identifying plaintiff Wall and Cooksey as “barred” members pursuant to the “Operating Agreement” harming by this extortion scheme the plaintiffs 29 U.S.C. 411 Rights. See: United States v. Dillard 101 F.2d 829 “where utterances were repeated again and again for a period of eighteen (18) months they were continuous enough to be a scheme”. The only difference between Dillard Supra and this instant RICO scheme is the degree of harm in this RICO scheme and the duration of the scheme. This is the beginning of the 18^th year of this continuous scheme not 18 months as in Dillard Supra.
On November 26, 2001, defendant Pezzenti gave intentional false testimony concerning the Hobbs Act violations and 530 assault committed against plaintiff Manos on July 30, 1997, furthering the 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(c) racketeering pattern, violating 1961(5). See July 1997 Executive Board Meeting extortion schemes at page 23, 24 of this RICO Complaint. On November 26, 2001, defendant Pezzenti gave perjured testimony continuing the July 1997 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) conspiracy. Relevant excerpts taken from Pezzenti deposition November 26, 2001:
Page 31:
Wall: “Do you remember how Stephen Manos left that meeting”
Pezzente: “I mean there was a lot of commotion, there was a lot of yelling. Steve was yelling. There was a lot of yelling and all I know is they just showed him the door, and he went out the door and that was it.”
Wall: “They just what?”
Pezzente: “He went out the side door, and that was it. That’s all I know.”
Wall: “The side door?”
Pezzenti: “Yea”
Wall: “Not the front door?”
Pezzente: “Wall, it was a patio restaurant. There was a side door there, and he just went out the side door”
Wall: “that’s a fire exit?”
Pezzente: “yes”
Wall: “So he just go up, said I’m leaving walked out the fire exit”
Page 35:
Pezzente: “Well, what happened with him is he was doing a lot of yelling. There was a faucet there, and he turned on the water, and he slipped on the water and fell down” and Frankie just helped him get up, and he took him to the door and there was a lot of yelling and hollering, and a lot of commotion and that was it”
Wall: “He slipped on the water?”
Pezzenti: “He slipped on the water, because the water flooded the whole floor, and somebody finally shut the water off.”
Wall: “And then Frankie – who’s Frankie?”
Pezzenti: “Frankie Freeman is a Vice-President of the Laborers’ Union now”
Wall: “And he helped him out the fire exit?”
Pezzente: “He helped him up. He fell down, he picked him up. That was it.”
Wall: “Were you ever questioned about that by anybody?”
Pezzente: “Yeah, I guess people from Washington came down, Inspectors came down, yeah. And I told them the same thing.
Wall: “You told them that he slipped on the water?”
Pezzente: “Well, I said he fell down. I don’t recall the water, but I do recall he fell down in the water.”
Page 36:
Wall: “Was that from Robert Luskin’s office, the Inspector?”
Pezzente: “Yes, I guess so.”
Wall: “It wasn’t F.B.I. Agents?”
Pezzente: “No. I think it was from Luskin’s Office.”

This testimony also shows defendant Luskin’s 18 U.S.C. 1503 scheme to divert and direct the Chicago, U. S. Attorney’s Office and the F.B.I. from substantive criminal investigation in the District of Connecticut and in so doing replacing them with (his) investigators, in order to cover Federal crimes and protect Arthur Coia Jr’s associate in fact enterprise (18 U.S.C. 1503).
The following illustration is the exact wording of two affidavits entered in 3:97-CV-02502(JCH) Dkt. #100 affidavit of Judith Dobrich dated August 30, 1999.
“l. I am over the age of 18 and understand and believe in the obligation of an oath.”
“2. My name is Judith Dobrich and I reside at 77 Hale Road in Glastonbury, CT.”
“3. I am a member of the International union of North America”
“4. I have been a member of Local 230 since 1994.”
“5. I was present during a meeting of Stephen Manos and assistant U.S. Attorney Craig Oswald and F.B.I. Special Agent Ernest Luera” (Chicago U. S. Attorney’s Office)”
“6. This Spring of 1997 meeting was held at the F.B.I. offices located in Meriden, CT.” (Before the 29 U.S.C. 530 assault).
“7. I expressed concern for the safety of Mr. Manos. Regarding his association with union bosses of Local 230”
“8. I specifically stated: “I am afraid that they are going to kill Steve and nobody will know why, because they’re all going to lie”
“9. U. S. Attorney Oswald stated: “If anyone so much as musses a hair on his [Manos’s] head, we will swoop down”
“10. After Mr. Manos was brutally assaulted on July 30, 1997 and while he was still in the hospital, I immediately contacted the Chicago Office of the Department of Justice”
“11. Soon thereafter, that same office cut off all communication with me with no explanation.”

Second Affidavit Stephen Manos dated also August 30, 1999 exact wording:

“1. I am over the age of 18 and understand and believe in the obligation of an oath.”
“2. My name is Stephen Manos and I reside at 77 Hale Road in Glastonbury, CT.”
“3. I am a retired member of Laborers’ International Union of North America” (retired because of fear Hobbs Act)
“4. I was Vice-President of Hartford Local 230 from June 1995 to June 1998.”
“5. In March of 1997, I personally met with Assistant U. S. Attorney General Oswald and F.B.I. Agent Ernest Luera in the F.B.I. offices in Meriden, Connecticut.” (Before the 29 U.S.C. 530 assault).
“6. Oswald and Luera work out of the Department of Justice in Chicago, Illinois.”
“7. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss racketeering activity occurring inside of Local 230.”
“8. I personally told Oswald and Luera that I was concerned about my physical safety because of my providing information to them.”
“9. Assistant U. S. Attorney Oswald responded with the following statement: “If anyone musses a hair on your head, we will swoop down.”
“10. I was physically assaulted by union officials at a Local 230 Executive Board Meeting held on July 30, 1997.”
“11. I reported this assault to Oswald and Luera and was subsequently abandoned by their department with all communication cut off and never an explanation.”

18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(c) PEZZENTI
In or about December 27, 1985, defendant Pezzenti knowingly filed a fraudulent Police Report in collusion with defendant Lopreato. The 1341 violation occurred in or about July or September 1986 via a subpoena to the Newington Police Department from Attorney David Kamins, Hartford, Connecticut. The fraudulent police report was mailed back to Attorney Kamins. Said fraudulent police report identified the baseball bat assault, as plaintiff Wall, and making the baseball bat assault union related knowing the mails would be used. In or about April 9, 1996, defendant Pezzenti “participated” in an 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 scheme to identify Wall and Cooksey as barred members (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c)). In or about March 2, 1998, defendant Pezzenti participated in an 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 scheme to identify plaintiff Wall and Manos as barred members. (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c)). In or about October 1997 defendant Pezzenti participated in a 18 U.S.C. 1341 scheme to the membership 740 Counts of mail fraud stating “there was no assault during the July Executive Board Meeting”---a continuation of the extortion of plaintiff Manos LMRDA Rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c)). Defendant
As just illustrated, in or about November 26, 2001, defendant Pezzenti gave intentional fraudulent statements in a sworn deposition, concerning the July 1997 extortion and assault committed against plaintiff Manos, with reasonable knowledge the mails would be used, violating 18 U.S.C. 1341 violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reasons of violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c). Defendant Pezzenti also gave on November 26, 2001, intentional fraudulent statements in sworn depositions concerning the December 1985 baseball bat assault knowing the mails would be used in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(c) see: Pleaded under “Demonstration Associate in fact 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) defendants Cheverie, Lopreato, LeConche and Pezzente Scheme” at pages 41 – 46 in this RICO Complaint.
DEFENDANT CHARLES LECONCHE defendant LeConche has been President and Business Manager of Local 230 at relevant times in this RICO Complaint. He has also been an associate in fact of the Coia enterprise at all relevant times in this RICO Complaint. Defendant LeConche is also a defendant in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH). Defendant LeConche’s business address is 475 Ledyard Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06114.
ENTERPRISE BACKGROUND LECONCHE
Defendant LeConche is an effective date (Oct. 15, 1970) RICO defendant. Defendant LeConche participated in the acquired control of Local 230 in or about 1970 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) through an unlawful conspiracy with Arthur Coia Sr., defendant Lopreato and defendant Pezzenti by filing fraudulent LM 15 and 16 Trusteeship Forms with the United States Department of Labor.
ENTERPRISE RACKETEERING INJURIES LECONCHE

From in or about 1986 to 1990 defendant LeConche participated in the affairs of an enterprise in the extortion of the plaintiffs’ LMRDA 401, 411 and 501 Property Rights. See: Platform Extortion Scheme at pages 20, 21, 22. In addition defendant LeConche interfered with by extortion plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey’s Right to Work. See: NLRB Case Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230/LIUNA et al 39-CV-3046. From in or about 1992 to 1996 defendant LeConche participated in a mail fraud scheme “indirectly” and “directly” in or about January 1996 against plaintiff Wall and Cooksey (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c)). On July 30, 1997, defendant LeConche committed multiple Hobbs Act violations and aided a 29 U.S.C. 530 assault against plaintiff Manos 29 U.S.C. 411 Rights see “July 1997 Executive Board Meeting Enterprise Racketeering Scheme” at pages 23 - 24 of this RICO Complaint. On March 17, 1998 defendant LeConche filed a complaint against plaintiff Manos in the district of Hartford LeConche Laborers’ Local 230 v. Manos 3:98-CV-00489(AWT) disguised as a tort action against plaintiff Manos for having a tape recorder on his person “for the purpose of a tortuous act against plaintiff” (LeConche) “in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2510”. In actuality said federal action LeConche Local 230 v. Manos Supra was an intentional act of extortion 18 U.S.C. 1951 fear of economic execution. Said extortion was also meant as “retaliating against a witness, victim” 18 U.S.C. 1513/1961(1) ¹¹. The 18 U.S.C. 1951/1513 Scheme was stopped because plaintiff Manos defended himself pro se and plaintiff LeConche and Local 230 withdrew the complaint about a year later because they could not go to discovery. All of the associates in fact defendants in this case have heard and know the contents of the July 1997 Manos tape. The defendant, Attorney (Tomasiewicz) in LeConche Local 230 v. Manos Supra criminal intentions Mens Rea were “the improper and tortuous use of legitimately issued Court process to obtain a result that is – unlawful” (abuse of legal process). On its face a legitimately issued Court process a RICO Sub Rosa Scheme – In actuality, participating in the conduct and affairs of an enterprise violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) by violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) defendant Tomasiewicz and defendant LeConche. Defendant LeConche harmed plaintiff Manos Federal Property Rights violating 18 U.S.C. 1951/ 18 U.S.C. 1513 “(retaliating against witness victim)”. Defendant Tomasiewicz harmed plaintiff Manos Federal Property Rights by violating 18 U.S.C. 1951/18 U.S.C. 1512 “(tampering with a witness, victim)” in a pattern of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961(5).
In or about June 21, 2002, in a second deposition conducted of defendant LeConche, defendant LeConche continued committing multiple acts of perjury in a scheme to harm plaintiffs Manos, Wall and Cooksey’s LMRDA Rights. See Boffa Supra 688 F.2d 919 reasonably anticipating the mails would be used see Davidson Supra 760 F.2d 97 (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c)) violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) 1961(1) 1341(5).
DEFENDANT ROBERT M. CHEVERIE
Defendant Robert M. Cheverie is General Counsel Local 230. Defendant Cheverie was appointed to that position in or about 1987 by Arthur Coia Sr. Defendant Cheverie has participated in the affairs of the enterprise since his appointment in or about 1987. In 1986 and continuing until 1990, attorney Cheverie participated in the extortion (Phase One) of plaintiff Wall and Cooksey 29 U.S.C. 411 through the Platform Extortion Scheme. From in or about 1996 to 1998, defendant Cheverie participated in the extortion (Phase Two) of plaintiff Manos 29 U.S.C. 411 Rights through the Platform Extortion Scheme, see pages 20, 21 and 22 of the RICO Complaint (Phase One and Two of the Platform Extortion Scheme).
In or about April 9, 1996, defendant Cheverie participated in the affairs of the enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) by composing, signing and causing the mailing and wiring of a fraudulent letter dated April 9, 1996 to the Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C., in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1961, 1341, 1343. Said letter was a Boffa Supra Scheme to deprive and harm plaintiff Wall and Cooksey’s LMRDA Rights (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order 5(c)).
In or about March 2, 1998, attorney Cheverie composed and caused the mailing and wiring of a fraudulent letter from the district counsel to Local 230, to the Inspector General in a scheme to deprive and harm plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Manos 29 U.S.C. 411 Rights violating 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c), 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343 (pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b) under Standing Order No. 5(c)).
From in or about July 1997 in a continuing “Open Ended” pattern of extortion of membership money (dating back to 1986), Attorney Cheverie violated with defendant Luskin and defendant Lopreato 29 U.S.C 501(c) see in this RICO Compliant at pages 7 through 9:
“MULTI SCHEME NO. TWO “ABSTRACT” AND “CONVERT” EMBEZZLEMENT TO DEFENDANT CHEVERIE AND LOPREATO VIOLATING 29 U.S.C. 501(c) 1962(d)(b)(c)”

See also page 9 through 11:
“MULTI SCHEME NO. THREE D.O.J. LUSKIN SIGNED AGREEMENT”
See Pages 11 through 12:
“MULTI SCHEME NO. FOUR EMBEZZLEMENT 29 U.S.C. 501(c) BY EXTORTION 18 U.S.C. 1951 CONTINUED AND FURTHERED BY THE OPERATING AGREEMENT”

DEPOSITION DEFENDANT CHEVERIE APRIL 25, 2002 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1962(d)(b)(c)

On April 25, 2002, defendant Cheverie continued a scheme dating back to 1985 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)(b)(c) to deprive and harm plaintiff Wall and Cooksey’s LMRDA Property Rights by committing multiple acts of perjury in a deposition knowing the mails would be used in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 violating 18 U.S.C. 1961(5). Because of the longevity of this 1962(d) associate in fact conspiracy, a summary showing is demonstrated.
APRIL 9^TH 1996 LETTER FABRICATED COURTROOM THREATS OF VIOLENCE

During the deposition of defendant Cheverie, April 25, 2002, plaintiff Wall questioned defendant Cheverie about a statement in the April 9, 1996 letter accusing plaintiff Wall of threatening Attorney Cheverie that being “I was personally threatened by Mr. Wall during the Court proceeding” for the Court’s convenience excerpts page 15-16
Wall: “And it said you were personally threatened by me in a Court proceeding?”
Cheverie: “That’s correct”
Wall: “Where was that”
Cheverie: “At the Nations Labor Board”
Wall: “while the court was in proceeding?”
Cheverie: “That’s correct”
Wall: “the Court was going on?”
Cheverie: “That’s Correct”
Wall: “What did the Judge do”
Cheverie: “The Judge took a recess and called all the lawyers in the back and he said to me “Mr. Cheverie, if you have any further questions for Mr. Wall, I’m concerned for your safety and I will not allow anymore questioning because I think Mr. Wall is going to attack you. Unless we have two federal Marshal’s between you and him, I’m not going to allow any further questions”. I said ‘Your Honor as long as you know what I’m dealing with, I have no further questions’. We came back out and said.
Wall: “Who was that? Wallace Nations?”
Cheverie: “Yes”
Wall: “How come nobody ever mentioned that to me?”
Cheverie: “It was off the record. We went in closed doors, just the lawyers. If your lawyer didn’t tell you, that’s between you and him.”
Wall: “My lawyer? I didn’t have lawyer”

We were proceeding without a lawyer because just before the trail started our attorney had a severe personal problem that caused him to go out of business. Also in addition to the fact that Judge Nations would never tolerate threats of violence in his Courtroom. He would never have Ruled in favor of plaintiffs (18 out of 18 counts) if he even thought for one second that I would attack someone in his Courtroom and he needed U.S. Marshals to protect Cheverie from me.
Pending in the District of Columbia in subpoena case Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 02-MS-354(TPJ) is a motion to compel the National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. to submit and allow the Hon. Judge Nations to answer the following Rule 31(a)(2) question.
“Was there any ex-parte meeting between Your Honor and Attorney Cheverie because you feared for physical safety because of Gary Wall yes_____ no_________”
DEMONSTRATION ASSOCIATE IN FACT 1962(d)(b)(c) DEFENDANT CHEVERIE, LOPREATO, LECONCHE AND PEZZENTI SCHEME

To start with, defendant Attorney Cheverie on April 25, 2002 was being questioned on the April 9, 1996 letter that he signed address to Inspector Lill Inspector General Office, Washington, D.C. Said deposition was by leave of the Court in Wall, Cooksey v. Local 230 et al 3:97-CV-00942(JCH). The subject matter of the deposition of defendant Cheverie was restricted by the Court to only the contents of the April 9, 1996 letter, which included the baseball bat assault of John Pezzenti (1985) and other alleged assaults and Hobbs Act violations allegedly committed by plaintiff Wall – stating also “during the majority of these incidents William Cooksey accompanied Mr. Wall” ALL of the allegations in the April 9^th letter have been proven false in depositions in 942(JCH).
In order to show the reckless flagrant frauds committed against plaintiff Wall and Cooksey in this one continuance 1962(d) conspiracy the plaintiffs will quote relevant excerpts from a police report and mail fraud mailings.
First Quote excerpt is from a Newington Police Report dated 12/27/85:
“Later in the interview Pezzente stated that on Friday afternoon he was at the Cane Mobil on Franklin Ave Hartford, and at about 1515 hrs he stated that he observed Gary Wall with a person known to Pezzente as one Sonny Castagna. According to Pezzente both Wall and Castagna got into a vehicle that was parked in front of 174 Franklin Ave. Hartford. The composites will be given out at the construction site (50 State St Hartford) and an interview with Lopreato is forth coming”.

50 State Street is where plaintiff Wall was employed at the time. In addition to the composites, the union posted a $10,000 dollar reward on the job site that was also put into the Hartford Courant.
Next excerpt is from the April 9, 1996 letter (signed by defendant Cheverie):
“In this regard, Wall was observed by Pezzente in the presence of Grasso shortly before the beating occurred. The attack done by individuals in ski masks wielding baseball bats, without any provocation or words exchanged, has been viewed as a “professional job”. This attack also was in close proximity to instances where Wall and Grasso attempted to run then Business Manager Dominick Lopreato off the road”.

Please compare the next excerpts from the March 2, 1998 letter with the April 9, 1996 letter and the excerpt from the 12/27/85 police report all on this page. Please take notice that in 1985 plaintiff Wall’s accomplish is Sonny Castagna. In 1989, Sonny Castagna went into the witness protection program so the defendants change the accomplish to Mr. Grasso who is now dead in 1996, and they put ski masks on the assailants because one composite looks like Sonny Castagna, then after plaintiff Wall raises that discrepancy in or about 1997 the defendant go back to Sonny Castagna. See Next Excerpt March 2, 1998 letter:
“Finally, Mr. Wall was observed in the presence of Mr. Castagna shortly before the beating of Business Agent John Pezzente at his home on December 27, 1985. Mr. Pezzente could not make a positive identification, but he clearly described individuals meeting Mr. Wall and Mr. Castagna’s general description in police reports, copies of which are attached.”

The act of mailing and wiring again in or about March 2, 1998 “police reports, copies of which are attached” continues the 18 U.S.C 1962(d) mail and wire fraud conspiracy from 1985 to 1998 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, for reasons of violating 1962(b)(c) and continuing into the Pezzente deposition November 26, 2001.
Next excerpt from deposition of defendant Pezzenti taken in 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) at Room 320, Hartford Federal Building, November 26, 2001:
Page 28:
Wall: “Did they have ski masks on?”
Pezzenti: “did they have what?”
Wall: “Ski masks?”
Pezzenti: “No. no ski masks no.”

Page 19:

Wall: “You remember saying that you saw Mr. Sonny Castagna and I, on Franklin Avenue?”
Pezzenti: “Yes, I do. That’s one thing I remember real good.”

Page 20

Wall: “Yea?”
Pezzenti: “On a Friday at 3:15 am at 3:15 pm there was a booking place across the street, where RICO Petrillo and all those bookies go there. And you walked out of that bookie, down Elliot down Franklin Avenue, up Elliot Street, and you got into a gray Buick. And at my house about 20 minutes to five, I don’t know who informed you where my house was, but you came running out. I got hit over the head several times, somebody yelling like a maniac and I was full of blood, and got up and yelled and I fell down, and then I ended up in the hospital. And I got one disc down here, and another one up here, which causes me to get dizzy and everything. And I got a separated stomach. You know what a separated stomach is? Well, I’ll show you, I exercise every day. Here’s that separated stomach (lifts shirt up). See that? (Hits self in stomach) that needs to be operated on. A big operation, on account of those clubs. And believe me, if I knew it was you. You wouldn’t be sittin there”

For the Courts understanding, defendant Pezzenti is a subordinate defendant placed purposely in hierarchal positions as a hierarchal actor in unlawful conduct dating back to Arthur Coia Sr 1970 to present day – because he will repeat and or do whatever the Hierarchal defendants tell him to do. He is sometimes used as Business Manager in election schemes. Defendant Pezzenti is semi illiterate that is one of the reasons he is used, the same common purpose defendant Luskin uses defendant Haynes. He will sign anything or say anything. During defendant Pezzenti’s deposition he constantly positively identifying plaintiff Wall as one of the assailants and then in an inconsistent fashion, infers plaintiff Wall is the assailant. At membership meetings, he yells out to members positively it was plaintiff Wall including plaintiff Cooksey in the crime. The associate in fact defendants in this RICO case will do anything to stop him from being exposed to a jury or a judge.
ADDITIONAL COMPONENT PART ENTERPRISE RACKETEERING SCHEME (IN APRIL 9, 1996) 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)

Please take notice on the previous page the sentence (in April 9, 1996 Letter):

“This attack also was in close proximity to instances where Wall and Grasso attempted to run then Business Manager Dominick Lopreato off the road”

Before reading the excerpts from the following depositions (Cheverie, LeConche, Lopreato), please take notice of the word instances (Plural), intentionally plural for reasons of framing plaintiff Wall for 18 U.S.C. 1951/1961(5) predicates. In addition, take into consideration that there is an agreement between the D.O.J. and the Operating Agreement to use the Operating Agreement’s investigations as Grand Jury material.
DEPOSITION DEFENDANT CHEVERIE APRIL 25, 2002
Page 14:
Wall: “Dominick Lopreato said that Mr. Grasso and I tried to run him off the road?”
Cheverie: “Correct”
Wall: “when you say Charlie, Charlie said it to?”
Cheverie: “Charlie related it to me, and then I spoke with Dominick.”
Wall: “Okay, and no one called the F.B.I. of this huh?”
Cheverie: “I don’t know”

Deposition defendant LeConche (Second deposition) taken June 21, 2002:

Page 50:
Wall: “then quote: This attack also was in close proximity to where Wall and Grasso attempted to run then business manager Dominick Lopreato off the road. Did Dominick ever tell you that?”
LeConche: “Yes, he did.”

Page 51:
LeConche: “Right. We were informed; right. I was informed”
Wall: “You were informed, it says we?”
LeConche: “By Mr. Lopreato?”
Wall: “By Mr. Lopreato?”
LeConche: “That’s correct.”

Deposition defendant Lopreato December 7, 2002:

Page 23:
Wall: “Got some wild stories here, boy. Here is another one. “This attack” on page 2 of that same April 9 Letter. “This attack also was in close proximity to instances where Wall and Grasso attempted to run then business manager Lopreato off the road”. Did you make that statement?”
Lopreato: “No”
Wall: “You never made that statement?”
Lopreato: “No”
Wall: “We never, Mr. Grasso and I never tried to run you off the road?”
Lopreato: “Not me.”
Wall: “That is what I mean you would have called the F.B.I. wouldn’t you?”
Lopreato: “I don’t know if I would’ve called the F.B.I.”
Wall: “But you would do something?”
Lopreato: “I probably would have done something”

Also regarding the Cheverie deposition of April 25, 2002
Page 9:
Wall: “Okay. Finally the brutal beating of John Pezzente at his home two days after Christmas is undoubtedly linked to Mr. Wall’s criminal associations” I’m reading from the letter. If I say something that you don’t agree with, correct me, please. In this regard Wall was observed by Pezzente in the presence of Grasso shortly before the beating occurred “who relayed that to you?”
Cheverie: “John Pezzente”
Wall: “And I was seen with Mr. Grasso shortly before the beating occurred?”
Cheverie: “That’s what he told me?”

PEZZENTE DEPOSITION NOVEMBER 26, 2001
Page 27:
Wall: (reading from April 9, 1996 letter) “In this regard Wall was observed by Pezzente, in the presence of Grasso, shortly before the beating occurred”
Pezzente: “I don’t know what you’re talking about.”
Wall: “Well, I’m just telling you what it says in the letter here”
Pezzente: “I don’t know nothing about it.”

Also in the Cheverie deposition of April 25, 2002 at Page 5:
Wall: “Would you explain why it’s your opinion that Mr. Cooksey and I are barred?”
Cheverie: “Yeah. I think my opinion based upon what was told to me by members of the Laborers’ Local 230 of your association with Billy Grasso, an organized criminal figure, by extension Mr. Cooksey’s association with you, and my opinion would render you both barred.”¹²

DEFENDANT CHEVERIE MAIL FRAUD 18 U.S.C. 1341 FABRICATION AND ISSUANCES OF FRAUDULENT FEDERAL SUBPOENAS ONE DATED MAY 11, 1998 THE OTHER DATED JANUARY 24, 2002

On January 24, 2002 plaintiff Cooksey was deposed in Room 320, Federal Building, Hartford, Connecticut by Attorney Robert M. Cheverie, Attorney Patrick Tomasiewicz and Attorney John T. Fussell in 3:97-CV-00942(JCH), plaintiff Wall present during the deposition plaintiff Cooksey realizes that the defendants attorneys have his psychiatric records.
Page 111:
Cooksey: “Can anybody tell who was given the medical records.”
Cheverie: “They were subpoenaed”.
Cooksey: “From the Fund?”
Cheverie: “Yes what happened was your disability pension records were subpoenaed as part of your disability pension record.”
Cooksey: “they didn’t have to notify me at all?”
Cheverie: “Not of the subpoena.”
Wall: “I didn’t get a copy of the subpoena”
Cooksey: “I was never notified they are my medical records, absolutely only use of these records are inside the fund, absolutely. I signed a declaration to that.”

Later in the deposition defendants entered defendants 44 and 45 Connecticut Laborers Pension Fund Pension print out forms. Upon review of the documents, plaintiff Wall noticed at the top of both documents a fax log which printed “01/24/2002 11:41 203-933-1083 CT Laborers page 2/4” on defendants 44 and a fax log on defendants 45 which printed “01/24/2002 11:41 203-933-1083 CT. Laborers page 3-4 page 4-4”. The fax number 203-933-1083 is the fax number of Connecticut Laborers Pension Fund. Just prior to that plaintiff Wall noticed that Attorney Fussell was making calls on his cell phone and going into the hallway waiting for someone. Finally, when plaintiff Wall thought he had seen enough, he politely confronted the attorneys about their racketeering scheme.
Page 130:
Wall: “Can I ask you a question here?”
Cheverie: “Not me, its not my – I am done with the document”

Page 131:

Wall: “I can’t ask you a question here?”
Cheverie: “No, I don’t know that I could answer it even if you did”.
Wall: “It’s a very simple question, I want to know if you, if you subpoenaed this document at the same time you subpoenaed the other thing.”
Cheverie: “of course.”
Wall: “You did”
Cheverie: “I would presume we did”
Wall: “Why was it just faxed to you today at 11:41 from the pension office, area code 203-983-1083? Let the record reflect that”
Cheverie: “Okay”
Attorney Tomasiewicz: “Let the record also reflect that Mr. Cheverie said I presume that it was subpoenaed versus, hold on sir, versus an intention on his part to record further reflect that during these proceedings an administrative assistant from Mr. Cheverie’s office came in here and let the record further reflect that during the questioning of Mr. Cooksey, Mr. Cheverie at all times was questioning was not outside the room, was not using the telephone to contact his office”

Page 132

And let the record further reflect that it is possible that this was faxed today that Mr. Cheverie made a mistake. Let’s go forward.”
Wall: “Let the record reflect also here that Mr. Fussell made a phone call 11:22, 11:29 and 11:53”.
Attorney Tomasiewicz: “that’s fine.” That’s fine”.
Wall: “and if anybody believes that you people aren’t working with the pension to rob our money, then we might as well watch cartoons”.

See next in this 1962(d) racketeering scheme – excerpts taken from deposition of Mr. Richard Weiss Executive Director of the Laborers Pension Funds April 29, 2002, Room 320 Hartford, Connecticut at page 67 – Wall is reading off the Cooksey deposition of January 24, 2002:
Wall: “Let the record reflect also here that Mr. Fussell made a phone call at 11:22, 11:29, 11:53. Now, I am going to stop reading this and ask you a question, Mr. Weiss, Do you recall Mr. Fussell calling your fund on the 29^th those three times?’
Director Weiss: “I have a general recollection that he did call on or about that date”
Attorney Paris: For the Fund and Weiss, (Murtha and Cullina): Ms. Paris “I would like to say that I know Mr. Cheverie’s Office represents the fund; is that correct?”
Director Weiss: “yes he does”
Ms. Paris: “So that discussions of conversation between Fussell and Mr. Weiss may be privileged and since they are not here, I would”
Wall: “They waived on the record”
Ms. Paris: “That may well be. But I am in a position where I am representing someone, and I believe there is an attorney/client privilege there. I don’t know what the extent of that is. I will at this point of this deposition, will not allow Mr. Weiss to say what the conversations with Mr. Fussell were”.
Att. Tomasicwicz: “I would absolutely join in with that objection”

INCRIMINATING FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE ISSUANCE OF (AFTER THE FACT) FRAUDULANT SUBPOENAS MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD 18 USC 1341, 18 USC 1343

FRAUDULENT SUBPOENA – dated May 11, 1998 3:97-CV-02502(JCH)

Defendant Cheverie stated on the record that he relied on an attorney who was no longer affiliated with Attorney Cheverie for the issuance of the May 11, 1998 subpoena. Said attorneys name was Mr. David McCarry. Both Attorney Cheverie and Attorney Fussell said they had no idea how to contact Attorney McCarry. The plaintiffs found attorney McCarry through their own initiative. He was employed at a Bridgeport, Connecticut Law Firm. Attorney McCarry submitted an affidavit stating he had no recollection of issuing a subpoena. Attorney McCarry could not have a recollection of issuing the May 11, 1998 subpoena. Because he did not file an appearance in 3:97-CV-02502(JCH) until May 20, 1998 the subpoena was fraudulently dated May 11, 1998.
Also as of the date, May 11, 1998, Mr. Cooksey was a proposed plaintiff in 3:97-CV-2502(JCH) – Attorney Cheverie was a defendant as of May 11, 1998. Mr. Cooksey was a proposed plaintiff by motion dated 8/4/98 entry date 8/5/98 Dkt. #53 2502(JCH). The Court by Ruling dated September 24, 1998 entry date September 25, 1998 2502(JCH) (Dkt. #58 Granted the plaintiffs motion to add additional parties. Quoting the Court in its relevant part. The court: ---“Grants the plaintiff’s motion to add additional parties [Dkt. No. 53] in particular, the plaintiff may add, as plaintiffs William Cooksey and Steven Manos”… The Court can see by this illustration that at the time of the issuance of the fraudulently fabricated Federal Subpoena, Mr. Cooksey was a proposed plaintiff in 3:97-CV-02502(JCH) and Attorney Cheverie was a defendant and Attorney McCarry had not filed an appearance as of that date.
FRAUDULANT SUBPOENA DATED JANUARY 24, 2002 3:97-CV-00942(JCH)
In order to simplify and make apparent the fact that the January 24, 2002 subpoena which was issued under the LMRDA case 3:97-CV-00942(JCH) was fabricated and fraudulently mailed on February 14, 2002 – the plaintiffs repeat again the testimony of Attorney Cheverie on January 24, 2002 at or about 12:30 – 1:00
Wall: “It’s very simple question, I want to know if you subpoenaed this document at the same time you subpoenaed the other thing.”
Cheverie: “Of course”
Wall: “You did”
Cheverie: “I would presume we did”
Those statements by Attorney Cheverie are illogical and incriminating concerning the January 24, 2002 fraudulent fabricated, after the fact, Federal Subpoena. The January 24, 2002 subpoena dated under “date and time” “January 24, 2002” “9:00am”. The “issuing officer signature” is that of Robert M. Cheverie. That would mean that in a time frame of (3) to (4) hours, Attorney Cheverie forgot he issued a subpoena for “all records pertaining to William Cooksey, Sr.’s pension”. This is what substantive subsection 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) was written for (unions and their pensions) in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) “and any union or group of individuals associate in fact although not a legal entity.” Multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343 in a racketeering scheme to “Ruthlessly Crush” the plaintiff Rights and in so doing defraud the Court and the Judicial System.

After filing motions, which included documented Exhibits showing the serious fraud committed against plaintiff Cooksey – Oral Argument was held on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction before Judge Hall on March 28, 2003. Included in the relief was a request for the Court to protect the plaintiffs from this serious breach of our Rights and for the Court to protect the integrity of the Court – said relief was requested in motion form and at the oral argument.
Page 87 Oral Argument
Wall: “Your Honor, and also, I think the Court should address the fraudulent subpoenas that Mr. Cheverie” ---
The Court: “I doubt that I would be addressing that”
Wall: “Why?”
The Court: “Because you’ve asked me to Grant a motion for Preliminary Injunction. I’m going to address that.”
Wall: “But that should be in there, also.”
The Court: “I’m glad that that’s what you think. I will look at it when I take it under advisement.”

The Court never addressed the fraudulent subpoenas or took it under advisement when Ruling against the plaintiff Rule 65 Injunction nor did the Court address the embezzlement 29 U.S.C. 501(c).
Wall At Page 86 Oral Argument
Wall: “Your Honor, I would appreciate it if, in your opinion, you do address Attorney Cheverie and you do address the embezzlement of union funds under 501(c) – and we are going to appeal, Your Honor, if”
The Court: “I assume if I rule for you, you wouldn’t appeal”

The avoidance of these issues i.e. fabricated after the fact, fraudulent Federal Subpoenas and embezzlement by abstraction of union funds for legal fees in violation of a signed agreement with the D.O.J. – are not issues of discretion, discretion in the meaning of, does Judge Hall have the discretionary right not to address those issues. She does not. Those issues inter alia caused and are causing severe proximate harm to the plaintiffs and severe harm to the membership and sever harm to the integrity of a Federal Courtroom. In addition, the defendants committing these 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) crimes do not only harm the plaintiffs, in addition, by Judge Hall refusing to address these crimes – Judge Hall emboldened and encourages the defendants and their attorneys to continue their flagrant disrespect for the Courtroom and its Rules. See in addition wrongdoer No. 9 District Judge Janet C. Hall at page 78 of this RICO Complaint.
DEFENDANT CONNECTICUT LABORERS FUNDS 435 Captain Thomas Boulevard – P. O. Box 569, West Haven, Connecticut 06516. From in or about 1992 (in this Civil RICO Complaint) to present day, the Connecticut Laborers Fund has been “Influenced” and “Controlled” by the 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) associate in fact enterprise that also controls LIUNA and Local 230 in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) for reasons of violating 1962(b)(c).
DEFENDANT RICHARD WEISS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CONNECTICUT LABORERS FUNDS

From in or about January 15, 1992 and continuing to present day, defendant Weiss participated in the affairs of an enterprise (18 U.S.C. 1961(4) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) by conspiring with defendants LeConche and Lopreato (union trustees) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) to embezzle plaintiff Wall’s and plaintiff Cooksey’s pension by an act of fraudulent depletion (plaintiff Wall’s entire pension) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 664 see: United States v. San Tiago 528 Fed. Rep. 2d 1130(2d Cir. 1976)
“Id. 1130 --“and that instruction that use by defendants of welfare fund monies for purposes other than those which the contributors intended meant same thing as conversion to defendants own use or to the use of another was not prejudicially erroneous”. Also see Finding No. 1 Id 1131 “General fund of union falls within meaning of term “another” as used in statute proscribing the conversion to one’s own use or to the use of “another” the funds or assets of a welfare fund 18 U.S.C. 664”

On January 15, 1992 both plaintiff Wall and plaintiff Cooksey signed for amounts to be appropriated into their pensions “Backpay Agreement” signed by Michael s. Bearse for Local 230, Peter B. Hoffman National Labor Relation Board, Wall signing for 13,420.74 and Cooksey signing for 11,364.92. Said “Backpay Agreement” stated in it relevant part “Full and complete performance by Laborers Local 230 of its obligations under this agreement shall constitute full and complete compliance by Laborers Local 230 of its backpay obligation”.
The plaintiffs’ quote now relevant excerpts of defendant Weiss deposition taken January 7, 2002, 450 Main Street, Hartford, CT. :
Page 9:
Wall: “Did Mr. Cooksey receive 11,364.92 in his pension?”
Weiss: “Well, I would have to go back and look.”
Wall: “Take your time. I am going to go get a drink of water.”
Attorney Paris: “He is ready”
Weiss: “I believe that the record reflects that the pension fund did receive that amount of money in connection with Mr. Cooksey.”
Page 10:
Wall: “That is not the question I asked you. The question I asked, did Mr. Cooksey receive 11,364.92 in his pension fund?”
Weiss: “No he did not.”
Now to page 11 Re: plaintiff Wall’s pension
Page 11:
Wall: “Now, that is also signed by Michael Bearse, I believe. Peter Hoffman, and that is my signature, Gary Wall. That also states full and complete performance by Laborers Local 230 of its obligation under this agreement shall constitute full and complete compliance by Laborers Local 230 of its backpay obligation to Wall. Do you see the amount 13,420.94? Did Wall receive $13,420.94 in his pension?”
Weiss: “No, he did not”
Later in the deposition of defendant Weiss plaintiff Wall is reading off documents subpoenaed from the fund for the deposition of January 7, 2002.
Page 27
Wall: “For example here, pension total for 0087 for Gary Wall $13,420.94 correct?”
Weiss: “Yes, it is.”
Wall: “Yes it is”
Wall: “So why does that come off my figure for 13,420.94? Someone puts money in the pension plan, doesn’t your pension plan grow by its interest? Why should I be penalized for that? What is the answer to that?”
Weiss: “Those were the arrangements agreed upon between counsel for the fund and the NLRB.”
That was January 7, 2002. On March 21, 2003, plaintiff Wall filed with the Office of the General Counsel, Washington, D. C. 20570, an NLRB 102.118 request that was granted by John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, on April 28, 2003. The principle question of the 102.118 request was directed to the (at that time) compliance lawyer NLRB Region 34 Hartford, now Assistant Regional Director Chicago NLRB Ms. Gail Moran.
Principle Relevant Question:

1. “Did you have knowledge of the after signing deduction of $4,092.49 by the pension?”
   

1. “I do not entirely understand your question. To the extent that you are asking if I knew, in early 1992, of any intended “after signing deduction” by the Pension Fund of monies to be credited to your account, my answer is no.”